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Abstract—In many Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
resources like CPU, memory, and battery power are limited
and cannot afford the classic cryptographic security solutions.
Silicon Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a lightweight
security primitive that exploits manufacturing variations during
the chip fabrication process for key generation and/or device
authentication. Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF as one of the most
popular silicon weak PUFs can generate secret bits by comparing
the frequency difference between any two ROs. Previous RO
PUFs improve flexibility and reliability through adding redun-
dant ROs, which incurs unacceptable hardware overheads. In
addition, traditional weak PUFs such as RO PUF generate chip-
unique key for each device, which restricts their application
in security protocols where the same key is required to be
shared in resource-constrained devices. In order to address
these shortcomings, we propose a crossover RO PUF (CRO
PUF) that improves flexibility, reliability and reduces hardware
overheads. It is the first PUF that can generate the shared key in
physically. The basic idea is to implement one-to-one input-output
mapping with Lookup Table (LUT)-based interstage crossing
structures in each level of inverters. Individual customization on
configuration bits of interstage crossing structure and different
RO selections with challenges bring high flexibility. Therefore,
with the flexible configuration of interstage crossing structures
and challenges, CRO PUF can generate the same shared key for
resource-constrained devices, which enables a new application
for lightweight key sharing protocols. Experimental results show
that our proposed PUF structure has much lower hardware
overheads, better uniqueness and reliability than the previous
configurable RO PUFs.
Index Terms—Physical unclonable function (PUF), ring oscil-
lator, flexibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
W ITH the increasing demands of security, privacy pro-tection, and trustworthy computing, key generation
and device authentication become two of the most challeng-
ing design concerns, particularly for systems such as smart
cards, sensors, and smart phones where the lack of persistent
power limits the duration of countermeasure enforcement [1].
Traditional security mechanisms store secret keys in electri-
cally erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM)
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or battery-backed non-volatile static random access memory
(SRAM), and combine cryptographic algorithms to implement
information encryption and authentication. In order to secure
cryptographic key storage, tamper-resistant devices with a
number of countermeasures to defeat various kinds of physical
attacks are developed. However, in many IoT applications,
resources like CPU, memory, and battery power are limited so
that they cannot afford the classic cryptographic security solu-
tions. Silicon physical unclonable function (PUF) emerged as
a new hardware primitive provides a unique device-dependent
mapping from challenges to responses based on the unclon-
able properties of the underlying physical device for device
authentication and key generation. The key generated by PUF
can resist tampering attacks because the underlying nano-scale
structural disorder will most likely be damaged during physical
tampering. Therefore, PUF is a promising security primitive
for Internet of Things.
There has been more than a decade of intensive study on
PUFs since it was introduced in the research community [2].
Among PUFs of different forms, silicon PUFs [3] [4] are of the
most interest in terms of fabrication cost and readiness to be
integrated to computing and communication devices. Current
silicon PUFs can be classed into strong PUFs and weak PUFs
[1]. The security of strong PUFs is based on their high entropy
content providing a huge number of unique challenge-response
pairs (CRPs), which can be used in authentication protocols.
On the other hand, weak PUFs exhibit only a small number
of CRPs to be applied. Although they are not applicable to
authentication protocols, the corresponding responses of weak
PUFs can be used as a device-unique key or seed for conven-
tional encryption systems, while maintaining the advantages of
physical unclonability [1]. Arbiter PUF [7] is a typical strong
PUF. SRAM PUF [9] and Glitch PUF [4]–[6] are typical weak
PUFs. Ring oscillator (RO) PUF [8] can be used as both strong
and weak PUF, but it only produces a limited number of CRPs
which are not large enough for authentication. Therefore, RO
PUF is more suitable for key generation. Besides, a RO PUF
does not require high symmetry and thereby is more easily to
be implemented on FPGAs than other PUFs such as Arbiter
PUF. In past decades, PUFs have attracted much attention in
academia and industry for various security related applications
such as hardware IP protection [3] [25], device authentication
[8] [30] [34] and software security [31].
B. Limitations of Prior Art
It is well-known that strong and weak PUFs enable a variety
of security protocols such as authentication [21] and encryp-
tion/decryption [8]. However, current weak PUFs exhibit a
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Fig. 1. Configurable RO PUF proposed in [10]
shortcoming when they are used in some security protocols.
They generate the chip-unique key for each device and cannot
be cloned in another device due to process variation, while
some security protocols such as multi-party communication
require many parties to share the same key. Therefore, current
weak PUFs are inapplicable to such application scenarios.
In addition, as a typical weak PUF, RO PUF is based on
the frequency difference among ROs to generate random bits.
An RO is a simple circuit of a set of inverters connected
in a loop with a particular frequency. The PUF generates
logic-0 or logic-1 by comparing the frequencies of any two
ROs. However, the delay difference caused by manufacturing
process variation is sensitive to environment, which makes the
PUF responses unreliable. The error correcting is a general
technique for correcting flips in PUF responses for many PUF-
related applications such as cryptographic key generator [22],
IC metering [23] and FPGA IP protection [25]. For example,
if the BCH (127, 64, 21) code is used, 10-bit errors in a 127-
bit PUF output can be corrected and the probability of failing
to re-generate a consistent output (false negative rates) is less
than 5×10−11 [8]. However, the overhead incurred by the ECC
increases quadratically with the number of errors. Therefore,
it is recommended to first use error reducing techniques to
reduce the bit flips and then use error correcting techniques
to correct any possible errors. Currently, many error reducing
techniques have been proposed for RO PUF, but high hardware
overhead is incurred. Therefore, effective low overhead error
reducing techniques are in urgent need.
C. Our Contributions
In order to address above two issues, this work proposes
a highly flexible configurable RO PUF, named Crossover RO
PUF (CRO PUF). We first report the concept of CRO PUF in
[24]. In this article, 1) CRO PUF-based key-sharing method
is new proposed; 2) CRO PUF-based secure information
transmission protocol is new proposed; 3) we elaborate the
details of the proposed CRO PUF with illustrative example
and in-depth discussion on shared-key generation, key-sharing
protocol, and security vulnerabilities. The main contributions
are as follows.
1) The flexible crossover RO PUF structure is proposed.
The interstage crossing structure can choose different
inverters in each level with input challenges and hence
can drastically mitigate the effect of environment on PUF
responses and generate more reliable responses.
2) CRO PUF-based key-sharing method and secure infor-
mation transmission protocol are proposed. It is the first
PUF that is able to generate the shared key in physically
with the flexible configuration of challenges and inter-
stage crossover structures, which enables the multi-party
communication for adjacent resource-constrained nodes.
3) Experimental results based on the public PUF dataset
[18] demonstrate that the CRO PUF has low hardware
overhead, good uniqueness and high reliability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related
work is elaborated in Section II. Section III gives a detailed
introduction about our proposed crossover RO PUFs. The
proposed CRO-based key-sharing is elaborated in Section IV.
Potential security threats and countermeasures are analyzed in
Section V. The detailed experimental results and analysis are
reported in Section VI. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
To improve reliability, the existing error reducing techniques
incur high hardware overheads and hence make them difficult
to be deployed in practice. In addition, traditional PUFs
cannot generate the shared-key in physically for some security
protocols. We will discuss in detail below.
A. Error Reducing Techniques
In order to improve reliability, 1-out-of-n RO PUF was
proposed [8]. The basic idea is to select two ROs with maximal
frequency difference among n ROs. However, 1-bit response
will waste (n − 2) ROs, which incurs unacceptable hardware
overheads. Tang, Lin and Zhang [15] proposed a frequency
offset-based reliability-enhancing technique for RO PUF. The
key idea is to make the frequency difference larger than a
given threshold by offsetting the frequencies of RO pairs to
improve reliability. In [19], Paral and Devadas proposed to use
string pattern matching to generate the PUF-based key without
error correction to reduce hardware overhead. Yin and Qu [20]
proposed a temperature aware collaboration (TAC) method for
RO PUF to invert the unreliable bits into reliable ones by
the cooperation between contributing RO pairs which may
generate unreliable bits. Recently, majority voting methods
[27] [28] that the minority is subject to the majority were
proposed to improve PUF reliability effectively. For example,
in [28], n basic PUF units vote to generate 1-bit reliable
response. Hence, 1-bit reliable response will waste (n − 1)
PUF units, which incurs high overhead for most of PUFs such
as Arbiter PUF and RO PUF.
In addition to above methods, reconfigurable/configurable
methods are most related to our work. Unlike traditional PUFs
exhibiting a static challenge/response behavior, reconfigurable
PUF exhibits dynamic unpredictable challenge/response be-
havior. In many practical applications such as resisting FPGA
replay attacks [11], side-channel attacks [11], modeling attacks
and man-in-the-middle attacks [12], we expect PUFs can
exhibit the reconfigurable challenge/response behavior. The
concept of reconfigurable arbiter PUF was first proposed by
Lee et al [7]. They proposed to integrate a floating gate transis-
tor into the delay lines of an arbiter PUF to physically change
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Fig. 2. Configurable RO PUF proposed in [14] [11]
the challenge/response behavior of the PUF based on a logical
state maintained in non-volatile memory [11]. Lao and Parhi
[13] proposed several reconfigurable silicon PUF structures
to change the behavior of silicon PUF after deployment and
also evaluated their reconfigurability by simulation. Recently,
Zhang et al [11] proposed to use reconfigurable PUFs to defeat
the replay attack and tested two reconfigurable PUFs that
exhibit high reconfigurability.
Similar to reconfigurable PUFs, configurable RO PUF is
introduced by Maiti and Schaumont [10] to improve RO PUF
reliability. As shown in Fig. 1, the key idea is that a 2 × 1
multiplexer is used to select one out of two inverters at each
stage of the RO. This technique uses the configurations with
the largest delay difference to improve the PUF reliability.
Another highly flexible configurable RO PUF was proposed
in [14]. The key idea is that a 2 × 1 multiplexer is used to
select or bypass the inverter to improve the reliability of RO
PUFs, as shown in Fig. 2. The configurations for RO pairs
are to choose the largest delay difference to generate reliable
PUF output. For these reconfigurable/configurable PUFs, the
utilization ratio of multiplexers added in ROs is low, and the
inverters are not fully used in some configurations.
B. PUFs for Shared-key Generation
In IoT, sensitive information needs to be transmitted to
participants over a potentially insecure communication, so
security features such as authentication and encrypted data
transfer are required. However, it is difficult to secure IoT with
security features used in traditional Internet [26]. In order to fit
such application scenario, the deployed security features must
be extremely lightweight. Instead of relying on heavyweight
public-key primitives or secure storage for secret symmetric
keys, PUF is a lightweight hardware primitive that can be
directly integrated in cryptographic protocols. So far, all ex-
isting PUF-enable encryption/decryption protocols follow the
same paradigm: PUFs generate the chip-unique key for each
resource-constrained device and cannot be shared securely in
another resource-constrained device. In this paper we consider
application scenarios where PUF-enable encryption/decryption
schemes fail to work: multi-party communication needs to
share the same key. To our knowledge, PUFs for shared-key
generation have not been reported in current references. We
construct the first and efficient PUF-based security protocol
for this setting. Therefore, this is the first work that PUFs
can generate the same lightweight shared-key in physically
for resource-constrained devices.
n ROs
in
te
rs
ta
g
e
 c
ro
ss
in
g
in
te
rs
ta
g
e
 c
ro
ss
in
g
in
te
rs
ta
g
e
 c
ro
ss
in
g
Counter
>
Mux
Counter
Challenge
Output
0 or 1
S1 S2 Sm-1
m levels
Fig. 3. Crossover RO PUF structure
III. CROSSOVER RO PUF
In order to improve reliability, generate shared-key and
resist potential attacks such as FPGA replay attacks, mod-
eling attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, we proposed a
crossover RO PUF that has advantages over the previous
configurable RO PUFs in terms of flexibility and reliability.
Considering 1-out-of-N coding, an RO PUF is comprised of
many ROs and the multiplexers select two of them to be
compared with the comparator [1]. Previous configurable RO
PUFs only use the single RO pair to implement configurability.
Our proposed crossover RO PUF structure is much more
flexible because we select every inverter from multiple RO
pairs with Lookup Tables (LUTs).
A. The Architecture of Crossover RO PUF
Crossover RO PUF consists of ROs and crossover structure.
An RO is composed of an odd number of inverters in a
ring, whose output oscillates between two voltage levels,
representing true and false. The inverters are attached in a
chain and the output of the last inverter is fed back into the
first one. Since a single inverter computes the logical NOT
of its input, the output of the last inverter in a chain with an
odd number of inverters is the logical NOT of the input of the
first inverter. The output of the last inverter is asserted a finite
amount of time after the input of the first inverter is asserted
and the feedback of the last inverter to the first inverter causes
oscillation. A circular chain composed of an even number of
inverters cannot be used as a ring oscillator, because the output
of the last inverter is the same as the input of the first inverter
[29].
Fig. 3 depicts the crossover RO PUF architecture that shows
the flexibility of selecting inverters in ROs. The crossover
RO PUF has n ROs and m levels of inverters. Each RO
consists of m inverters with a particular frequency. The m
should be larger than 2, otherwise, the RO would oscillate too
fast to be precisely counted by the counter. For m levels of
inverters, the outputs of previous inverter level are fed as the
inputs to the next inverter level after interstage crossing. The
interstage crossing cell determines the routing path of step
signals input without any additional logical operation. There
are m-1 interstage crossing cells to change the configuration
of the delay loop with selection inputs.
As shown in Fig. 3, configuration selection S =
(S1, S2, ..., Si, ..., Sm−1), where Si has dlog2ne bits and de-
termines the connection order of inverter to the next inverter
IEEE, 2018. 4
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Fig. 4. LUT-based interstage crossing network
level in i-th stage; The configuration selection S and challenge
are combined together as the whole challenge to be input into
the CRO PUF for generating the response. Sm−1 is dedicated
to ensure closed loops. The number of possible different
configurations of the delay loops is (Ann)
m−2. The level m
must be an odd number and m > 2 in order to make the delay
loop form the oscillation, and it can determine the frequency
level of the RO. The m is not directly related to n. The n
determines the number of possible challenges, while the m
determines the frequency level of the ROs. The larger m which
means more inverters in RO exhibits lower frequencies. In
practical applications, the frequencies of ROs should not be too
high and too low. If the frequency is too high, high-precision
counter is required; if the frequency is too low, the time to
generate response would be long, and hardware and power
overhead would be increased. Usually, we can set m to 5 or
7 which is the empirical value that meets above requirements.
Under the precondition of ensuring a one-to-one mapping,
the connection of inverters can be customized by the designers
and users. After selecting inverters in each level, we can get a
group of fixed sequence of RO pairs. Any two of ROs chosen
by the challenge through multiplexers are connected to the
clock input ports of the two counters to generate 1-bit PUF
response by comparing the values read from the two counters
within a period of time. The arbiter generates a logical 0 or 1
for this chosen RO pair depending on which RO has the higher
frequency. By choosing different inverters to build ROs with
input challenges, the delay difference for each pair of RO will
generate more bits.
B. Interstage Crossing
In this section, we introduce a high flexibility interstage
crossing with LUTs. Fig. 4(a) shows the internal structure
of a 3-input LUT. An n-input LUT can be configured to
implement any n-input logic function. For example, SRAM
can be set with ‘00011011’ in initialization phase to implement
the function A0 · A2 + A1 · A¯2, and set with ‘00100111’ to
implement A¯0 ·A2 +A1 ·A2. By configuring SRAM, we can
easily get the logic function required in interstage crossing.
Fig. 4(b) gives an example of a 4-bit crossing network with
a4=7a2=6 a3=8 a5=5
d4=4d2=5 d3=6 d5=3
c4=6c2=4 c3=6 c5=5
b4=5b2=7 b3=4 b5=5
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Fig. 5. A 4× 5 crossover RO PUF structure
6-input LUTs. Each LUT takes A, B, C, D as 4-bit inputs and
the rest two inputs as the selection imports. If the selection
bits are configured as 00,01,10,11, the output of the LUTs will
be A, B, C, D. In the same way, the output of the LUTs will
be shuffled as B, C, D, A when selection bits are 01,10,11,00.
Since the data inputs and outputs of all the interstage cross-
ing must form a one-to-one mapping, no duplicated outputs are
allowed in the network. In addition, even though adversaries
can get all configuration bits from the SRAM of LUTs in
interstage crossing, they cannot get any delay information of
inverters and hence cannot derive the responses.
Considering the influence of delay added in interstage
crossing, the existing FPGA design tools can minimize the
delay-skew between a pair of routes, but they do not guarantee
the structural symmetry [16]. For example, the multiplexers
and inverters in a configurable RO PUF will be connected
to the switch matrix which uses routes with different lengths
depending on the individual placements. So if the manufactur-
ing process variation is insufficient to offset it, the interstage
crossing structure could make entire PUF circuit be highly
biased. Our method can set all connections of inverters by
configuring SRAM without impacting the routing in switch
matrixes. It means LUT-based interstage crossing has high
flexibility to improve PUF reliability.
C. Flexibility and Reliability
Our proposed crossover RO PUF can get larger frequency
differences between ROs than previous reconfigurable PUFs
and hence generate more reliable PUF responses. In what
follows, we give an example to explain the advantage.
As shown in Fig. 5, consider 4 × 5 ROs have 4 rows
inverters, RO1 to RO4, and each consists of 5 inverters.
Assuming the delays of these inverters are: {a1 = 3, a2 = 6,
a3 = 8, a4 = 7, a5 = 5}, {b1 = 9, b2 = 7, b3 = 4, b4 = 5,
b5 = 5}, {c1 = 5, c2 = 4, c3 = 6, c4 = 6, c5 = 5}, {d1 = 2,
d2 = 5, d3 = 6, d4 = 4, d5 = 3},where ai to di denote the
delay of the i-th inverter from RO1 to RO4, respectively. The
total delays of four ROs are:
DRO1 = 3 + 6 + 8 + 7 + 5 = 29
DRO2 = 9 + 7 + 4 + 5 + 5 = 30
DRO3 = 5 + 4 + 6 + 6 + 5 = 26
DRO4 = 2 + 5 + 6 + 4 + 3 = 20
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When using decoupled neighbor coding, RO1 is 1 unit of
time slower than RO2, and RO3 is 6 units of time faster
than RO4. The delay difference can be up to 10 units of
time with 1-out-of-n coding method [8]. Generally, a large
delay difference can generate a reliable bit. With the ingenious
selection in crossover structure, {b1, b2, a3, a4, a5}, {a1, d2,
c3, b4, b5}, {c1, a2, d3, c4, c5} and {d1, c2, b3, d4, d5} are
used to build RO1 to RO4. The delay difference becomes
12 (RO1 and RO2) and 11 (RO3 and RO4) units of time.
The largest delay difference is 19 units of time, which is
about twice as large as the delay difference when there is
no interstage crossing in the ROs. The delay of each inverter
is unpredictable due to fabrication variation. Any inverter in
an RO is faster or slower than the inverter at the same position
in another RO with equal probability.
In the above example, although {a1, a2} in RO1 is slower
than {b1, b2} in RO2, the total delay difference will be reduced
when including the rest inverters. When reconfiguring RO with
the interstage crossing, we can choose inverters ingeniously to
increase the gap of total delay between two ROs, which makes
the outputs more reliable.
IV. CRO PUF-BASED KEY-SHARING
A. Principle of Shared-key Generation
The shared key is required in multi-party communication
between different devices. Traditional PUFs generate chip-
unique key for every device, while CRO PUF is able to
generate the same shared key for all devices. Therefore,
CRO PUF is suitable for one-to-many authentication. CRO
PUF is based on the inter-stage crossover structure which
can be configured with the SRAM value. Different devices
can produce the same response as the shared key with
the appropriate configurations and challenges. For a CRO
PUF with n rows and m columns, there are (m-1) dlog2 ne-
bit selection signals which have (Ann)
m−2 combinations.
The challenge C can have up to A2n different selections
with the multiplexers to select any two ROs for frequency
comparison. With the increasing of n and m, the number of the
selection signals and the challenges increases exponentially.
In addition, the number of configurations of inter-stage
crossover structures provides high flexibility for one-to-many
authentication. The delay model of a CRO PUF with n rows
with k inverters is shown as follows.
DelayRO =
d11 d12 . . . d1j . . . d1k
d21 d22 . . . d2j . . . d2k
...
...
...
...
di1 di2 . . . dij . . . dik
...
...
...
...
dn1 dn2 . . . dnj . . . dnk
The delay vector of each line DRO =
{D1, D2, . . . , Di, . . . , Dn}, where Di =
∑k
j=1 dij . The
selection signal S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sj , . . . , Sk−1), where Sj
controls the connection path between the j-th and (j+1)-th
column inverters, i.e,
{d′1j , d′2j , . . . , d′nj} = f(d1j , d2j , . . . , dnj)
The challenge CRO is used to choose different rows of ROs
for the frequency comparison, i.e,
{D′1, D′2} = g(D1, D2, . . . , Dn)
The selection signal S adjusts the delay of each column
with the function f. Challenge uses the function g to select
different rows of ROs for comparison to generate the response.
The delay is different between any two CRO PUFs, but we
can get the same response by using function f and g with
different CRO and S. Function f and g are independent. The
function f is to rearrange the column vectors, and the function
g is to select the column vector elements. In the one-to-many
authentication, f and g are used for the configuration to get the
same response from any two different CRO PUFs. Based on
this, we can design a shared pairing key generation scheme.
In what follows, we give an example to explain the idea.
Taking two CRO PUFs as an example, each CRO PUF con-
tains four 4-layer inverters. The corresponding delay models
are represented by matrices A and B, respectively.
A =
3 6 8 5
9 7 4 5
5 4 6 5
2 5 6 3
B =
2 4 6 5
5 1 3 2
8 6 5 7
3 6 4 5
Consider the following challenges:
CA = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}
CB = {{1, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 2}}
In this case, the responses of both CRO PUFs are {0,1,1}.
Similarly, assuming the challenges are
CA = {{4, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}}
CB = {{1, 2}, {2, 4}, {4, 3}}
Keep the selection signals S in A unchanged and adjust S2
and S4 in B, the path delay models become
A =
3 6 8 5
9 7 4 5
5 4 6 5
2 5 6 3
B =
2 4 6 5
5 6 3 7
8 1 5 5
3 6 4 2
The delays of A and B become
DA = {22, 25, 20, 16}
DB = {17, 21, 19, 15}
In this case, the responses of both CRO PUFs are {0,1,0}.
B. Modeling of Delay Matrix
We used machine leaning algorithms to model the CRO
PUF and get the required delay matrix. The real delay matrix
of the PUF that is implemented on hardware is called the
original delay matrix, and the delay matrix we obtained
through modeling is called the predicted delay matrix.
In the real scenario, it is difficult to get the original delay
matrix, but all delay paths and their corresponding numbers
in the counters can be measured on the CRO PUF. Therefore,
the predicted delay matrix can be generated with the following
two steps:
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1) Enumerate all delay paths and get the numbers in the
counters on the original delay matrix.
2) Build a model to obtain the predicted delay matrix.
Generally, the PUF responses are generated with the chal-
lenges that are used to select any two delay paths to compare.
For example, as shown in Fig. 6, the delay difference between
the two paths (marked as red and blue) is (a1+d2+c3+b4+
a5)− (c1 +a2 +d3 + c4 + c5). However, in the actual model,
the delay parameters are difficult to be predicted using original
CRPs. Therefore, during the delay predicting phase, we use
the numbers in the counters to compute the exact values of the
delay of each configuration, named as Counts. For example,
the configuration of the red path “(a1 + d2 + c3 + b4 + a5)”
in Fig. 6 and the parameters of the delay matrix W can be
shown as follows.
C =
1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
W =
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
C • W is the dot product of the matrix C and W, so the
number Counts in the counter given by:
Counts =
1
C •W (1)
All delay paths and their corresponding numbers in the
counters can be enumerated for a CRO PUF. Therefore,
machine leaning algorithms can be used to fit the parameter W
to get the predicted delay matrix of CRO PUF. In this case, the
input-output behavior of CRO PUF is completely consistent
with the predicted model.
Note that there is a counter access interface implemented by
fuses in the PUF so that the designer can obtain the numbers
in the counters to model the PUF, and then burn the fuses to
destroy the access interface before distributing the chips for
usage [33]. In this way, designers can model the PUF while
attackers are prohibited.
C. Shared-key Generation
1) Reliable response Generation for Shared-key: Shared-
key generation requires CRO PUF generating stable responses.
As discussed above, we can get a high accuracy predicted
delay matrix already. Therefore, the delay difference between
Algorithm 1  Get the threshold 
1   input：Delay matrix A, Empty set B 
2   output：Threshold T 
3   Initialize：D: the set of all possible path delay in A 
4   for d1 ∈ D, d2 ∈ D and Path(d1) ≠ Path(d2) do 
5      B ← { ( |d1 - d2|, Config(d1, d2) ) }∪B   
6      // Config(d1, d2) : the configuration challenge of d1 and d2 
7   end for 
8   Sorted(B)  // sorted by descending order according  
9            // to the absolute value of delay difference 
10  N = Size(B) 
11  for i = 1, 2, ... , N do  // (Xi , Yi) ∈ B 
12     // Xi : the absolute value of the delay difference 
13     // Yi : the configuration challenge 
14     if Yi generates an unstable response at different temperatures then  
15        T = Xi’  // Xi’ is a reasonable value greater than Xi 
16        break 
17     end if 
18  end for 
19  return T 
 
any two paths can be obtained easily. On this basis, we sort the
absolute values of the delay differences between all the paths
by descending order, and take into account the influence of
different temperatures to determine a threshold T . When the
absolute value of the delay difference between the two paths is
greater than the threshold, the response of the two paths can
be considered stable even under different temperatures. The
selection of threshold shows as the Algorithm 1. In this
algorithm, we store the absolute value of delay difference and
configuration challenge between all paths in the set B. Then
we sort the elements in B by descending order according to the
absolute value of delay difference. Finally, we enumerate the
elements in B to determine whether the configuration challenge
can generate stable response at different temperatures. If a
configuration challenge does not produce a stable response,
we will use the absolute value of the delay difference between
the two paths as the threshold T , and the threshold would be
increased to ensure that a stable response is generated. The
detailed explanation for Algorithm 1 is as follows.
• Store all paths of delay matrix A into the set D (line 3);
• Enumerate all combinations of two different paths in the
set D (line 4-7);
• Store the absolute value of the delay difference, config-
uration and challenge of two paths into the set B as an
element (line 5);
• Sort the elements in the set B by descending order
according to the absolute value of delay difference (line
8);
• Enumerate the elements in the set B and determine
whether the response generated by the corresponding
configuration and challenge keeps stable at different
temperatures (line 11-18);
• If stable, continue to enumerate the elements in the
set B. Otherwise, use the absolute value of the current
delay difference as the appropriate threshold T and end
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Algorithm 2: Challenge generation 
1   input˖Delay matrix A, Threshold T, Shared-key K 
2   output˖Challenge C 
3   Initialize˖D: the set of all possible path delay in A 
4   N = Size(K) 
5   for i = 1, 2, ... , N do 
6      while d1 ← random(D), d2 ← random(D) and Path(d1) ≠ Path(d2) do 
7         // random(D) : select a random path delay in D 
8         if Ki == 1 and d1 - d2 > T then  // Ki is the i-th bit of K 
9            Ci = Config(d1, d2)  // Ci can generate Ki 
10           break 
11           // Config(d1, d2) : the configuration challenge of d1 and d2 
12        else if Ki == 0 and d1 - d2 < -T then 
13           Ci = Config(d1, d2) 
14           break 
15        end if 
16     end while 
17  end for 
18  C = {C1, C2, … , CN} 
19  return C 
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the loop. Note that, in practice, the threshold will be
increased slightly to ensure response 100% reliable (line
14-16).
2) Challenge Generation for Shared-key: In the key-sharing
protocol which we will introduce in the next Section, a trusted
third party (TTP) possesses the delay matrix of CRO PUF
and the threshold for generating a stable response. The TTP
needs to generate the challenges of CRO PUFs corresponding
to the key that needs to be shared. In this Section, we
propose a heuristic challenge generation algorithm shown in
Algorithm 2. In the Algorithm 2, for each bit of the
key, the TTP will randomly select two paths and determines
whether their delay differences are greater than the threshold.
If Yes, TTP will get configuration challenge for these two
paths, otherwise TTP would reselect another two paths ran-
domly to compute the challenge. The detailed explanation for
Algorithm 2 is as follows.
• Store all paths of delay matrix A into the set D (line 3);
• Enumerate all the bits of the shared-key K (line 4-17);
• Randomly select two different paths from the set D (line
6-16);
• For each bit of the shared key Ki, if Ki equals 1 and
the delay difference is greater than T , it means that we
found a configuration challenge Ci that can generate a
stable response 1 (line 8-10); If Ki equals 0 and the
delay difference is less than −T , it means that we found
a configuration challenge Ci that can generate a stable
response 0 (code line 12-14); Otherwise, return to step 2.
• The configuration challenge C is composed of all Ci (line
18).
D. Key-sharing Protocol
As discussed above, CRO PUF can generate the shared key
with the flexible configuration of S and C. Therefore, it can
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Fig. 7. CRO PUF-based key-sharing and secret information transmission
protocol
be used as authentication of multi-party communication for
adjacent resource-constrained nodes. As shown in Fig. 7, we
propose a CRO PUF-based key-sharing and secret information
transmission protocol.
Assuming that PUFA and PUFB require sharing the key.
First, we send the delay matrix of PUFA and PUFB to the
TTP, and in this case, the TTP carries the delay matrix of
PUFA and PUFB . Second, the TTP selects a key K that
needs to be shared between PUFA and PUFB . Third, TTP
generates the challenge CA and CB according to the delay
matrix of PUFA, PUFB and the shared-key K. Then TTP
sends CA and CB to PUFA and PUFB , respectively. Finally,
PUFA and PUFB are able to generate the shared-key K with
CA and CB , respectively. In the whole process, there is no
secret key transmission. Besides, configuration information S
is not the secret information and can be stored in SRAM.
Therefore, it is with high security and low cost to realize the
key-sharing among multi-parties.
After PUFA and PUFB have obtained the shared-key, they
can transfer the secret message to each other. For example,
we suppose that Alice needs to send message M(10100101)
to Bob. At this time, Alice encrypts the message M by XOR
with the secret key K(01101001) to generate the encrypted
message M ′(11001100 = K ⊕ M ), and sends M ′ to Bob.
After receiving the M ′, Bob gets the message M (10100101
= M ′ ⊕K) by XOR with the secret key K.
As discussed above, a CRO PUF-based key-sharing method
and the corresponding secure information transmission proto-
col are proposed. It is noted that PUF-based key-sharing is
not specially designed for RO PUF but also can be applied to
other PUF structures, provided that the delay information are
obtained by testing and appropriate challenges are selected.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The most important feature for physical unclonable function
is “unclonable” obviously. However, this feature is threatened
with the attack techniques reported recently. Machine leaning
(ML)-based modeling attacks and side-channel attacks are two
kinds of main threatens for RO PUF.
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A. Modeling attacks
ML-based modeling attacks are the most efficient attack for
strong PUFs which have a publicly accessible CRP interface so
that attackers can collect a large number of CRPs to model the
PUF with the mathematical way [1]. For example, our recent
experimental results show that machine learning can foresee
arbiter PUF responses to given 1000 CRPs with prediction
rates up to 99%. However, crossover RO PUF is used as the
weak PUF instead of strong PUF. The corresponding responses
are used as keys. In such application, there is no access
interface to read the key generated inside the chip so that the
key will not be exposed to attackers (CRP access interface is
implemented by fuses which will be destroyed after designers
obtain the CRPs [33]). Therefore, CRO PUF is immune to
ML-based modeling attacks.
B. Side-channel attacks
Side-channel attacks statistically analyze the time, power
consumption or electromagnetic emanation of the crypto-
graphic devices to gain knowledge about integrated secrets.
Most recently, Merli et al. carried out side channel attacks
(EM analyses) on an RO PUF FPGA implementation leading
to the extraction of a full PUF model and thereby breaking the
PUFs security [17]. The authors also point that their proposed
attack can be successful because they exploit that each RO
has a fixed location and a specific measurement path through
a multiplexer to a counter. In this paper, we can dynamically
change the inverters of ROs with different configuration data
to generate the updated key, which makes each RO have no
fixed physical location and therefore our proposed crossover
RO potentially provides a new solution to resist side channel
attacks. Moreover, the security can be enhanced by increasing
the number of inverters in ROs and levels of ROs.
C. Cloning detection
In addition to resist cloning attacks, detecting simple clone
is also feasible for CRO PUF. In [32], we illustrated a simple
cloning scenario as follows.
Cloning Scenario: There are two RO pairs (A, B and C, D)
with 5 inverters in each, generating two bits ‘01’. This means
delay.A > delay.B, and delay.C < delay.D. The attackers can
use the EM emanation to measure these two relations. To clone
this PUF, they can simply build A and D with 5 inverters and
build B and C with 1 inverter. The mismatching of inverter
numbers will guarantee the cloned PUF generates the same
response with the original one.
The traditional RO PUF is unable to detect the above
cloning scenario. However, this potential clone can be detected
with the help of configuration vectors of our proposed con-
figurable RO PUF. In what follows, an authentication-based
cloning detection method is proposed to determine whether
CRO PUF is cloned or not.
The idea is alternated by authentication process. Besides
the secret key configuration vector Vk, we introduce the
testing vector Vt for anti-cloning purpose. Testing vector Vt
is carefully selected to generate stable testing response Rth.
In the working phase, Vk is configured to PUF to obtain the
reliable secret key. In detecting phase, Vt is configured to PUF
to achieve the test bitstream Rth. For cloning detection, we
can use multiple testing vectors. All these vectors should be
very different with each other. It is better to cover all the
inverters during the testing phase. In the cloning scenario,
it could possibly provide the same response under a specific
configuration vector. However, when several configuration vec-
tors are used, the probability of generating the right responses
decreases dramatically.
The rationale of above approach is that configurable RO
can be used to generate CRPs. The configuration vector is the
challenge. The famous 1-out-of-8 RO PUF and [10] provide
the challenge and response schematics, respectively. But the
sizes of their challenges are not large enough for authentica-
tion. Configurable RO PUF can provide enough CRPs with
adequate length of each RO. Even though configurable RO
PUF can be used in authentication field, we do not suggest
it to be a conventional authentication PUF, like arbiter PUF.
People should not get unlimited access of Vt, otherwise it
will suffer from modeling attacks. A few carefully selected
configuration vectors are enough to reduce the cloning risk
[32].
In addition to the above discussed cloning scenario, there
would be other cloning scenarios, and the corresponding
countermeasures also need to be developed. We call for more
comprehensive researches on this topic.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of crossover
RO PUF are conducted based on the public PUF dataset
of Virginia Tech [18]. This dataset consists of frequency of
ROs from 198 Xilinx Spartan (XC3S500E) FPGA boards.
Since this dataset only has the frequency of ROs without
individual inverters, we can treat each RO as an inverter in
our experimentation due to the lack of public data on delay at
inverter level.
Among the 198 boards, 194 boards measure the frequencies
of ROs at the temperature 25◦C and the supply voltage
of 1.20V. The other five boards measure the frequencies
at varying supply temperatures and voltages. The ranges of
temperatures are 25◦C, 35◦C, 45◦C, 55◦C and 65◦C. The
supply voltages are 0.96V, 1.08V, 1.20V, 1.32V, and 1.44V.
We use the frequency dataset from five boards (D059546,
D113702, D113938, D225158 and D225159) to compare the
hardware efficiency, uniqueness and reliability for traditional
neighbor coding method, rPUF in [14], and our proposed
crossover RO PUF, respectively.
A. Hardware Efficiency
The total number of configurations is determined by the
number of inverters in ROs and levels of ROs in the crossover
RO PUF structure. There are (Ann)
m−2 configurations in n
ROs when each RO has m (m must be odd and m > 2) level
inverters. For the rPUF [11] which has n ROs and m levels
of inverters, the number of possible different configurations of
the delay loops is ∑m−12
i=1 (C
2i+1
m )
n, where i = 0, 1, ..., m−12 .
As shown in TABLE I and TABLE II, when the number of
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TABLE I
NUMBER OF CONFIGURATIONS FOR CROSSOVER RO PUF.
m n = 2 n = 4 n = 6 n = 8
3 2 24 720 40320
5 8 13824 1.73E+08 6.55E+13
7 32 7.96+06 1.93E+14 1.07E+23
9 128 4.59E+09 1.00E+20 1.73E+32
TABLE II
NUMBER OF CONFIGURATIONS FOR RPUF [11]
.
m n = 2 n = 4 n = 6 n = 8
3 1 1 1 1
5 101 10001 1.00E+06 1.00E+08
7 1667 1.69E+06 1.92E+09 2.29E+12
9 24229 3.04E+08 4.35E+12 6.60E+16
TABLE III
HARDWARE OVERHEAD OF THE LOGIC ELEMENTS IN THE DESIGN
Logic Element Overhead in terms of NAND gates
5-stage ring oscillator 5
2-to-1 MUX 9
4-to-1 MUX 13
8-to-1 MUX 21
7-stage ripple counter 49
ROs is 8 and the levels of each RO is 5, the total number of
configurations of crossover RO PUF reaches 6.55E+13 which
is 6.55E+5 times larger than rPUF. We can see from TABLE
I that the total number of configurations grows exponentially
with the increasing of m and n, which provides a simple way
to increase the PUF response bits.
The RO PUF usually consists of some basic components
such as ROs, multiplexers, counters, comparators and so on.
We can calculate the total overhead of each RO PUF with
the overhead of components in TABLE III. For example,
decouple neighbor coding uses 512 ROs to form 256 RO
pairs to generate 256-bit response; the overhead is 256× (2×
5 + 2 × 49) = 27648. For a rPUF with 14 5-level ROs, the
overhead is 14 × (2 × 5 + 2 × 5 × 9 + 2 × 49) = 2772.
For a crossover RO PUF with 4 5-level ROs, the overhead is
4× 5 + 4× 13× 4 + 2× (49 + 13) = 352.
In order to evaluate the hardware efficiency of our proposed
CRO PUF, we define the reliability threshold factor [15] which
is denoted as σ. Consider a pair of ring oscillator, ROA
and ROB , and assume their frequencies are FA and FB ,
respectively. Then | FA − FB |≥ FTH = Frefσ, where
Fref is the frequency of reference RO, and σ is the reliability
threshold factor [15].
We use the bits per NAND gate to evaluate the hardware
overhead of each RO PUF. Fig. 8 denotes the comparison of
hardware efficiency of three methods. The hardware efficiency
is denoted by the number of bits generated by per NAND gate.
As shown in Fig. 8, more hardware resource would be used
when the criterion on reliability threshold factor for acquiring
reliable ones is tightened, and crossover RO PUF is obviously
more efficient than the other two methods. For example, when
σ is set to 0.01, compared with decouple neighbor coding and
rPUF, CRO PUF can get 9.29 times and 1.26 times hardware
Fig. 8. Comparison of hardware efficiency
Fig. 9. HD of crossover PUF on five boards (T=25◦C and U=1.20V)
reduction, respectively, when generating the same number of
PUF response bits.
B. Uniqueness
The uniqueness shows that different chips will have distinct
PUF outputs when fed with the same challenge. If the output
information of PUF is used for uniquely identifying the chip,
it is unacceptable that different PUFs produce the same or
similar responses. Average Hamming distance (HD) is used to
evaluate the uniqueness of PUF responses. For k L-bit PUF
responses: P1, P2, . . . , Pk, the average HD is calculated as
follows.
u =
2
k(k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
HD(Pi, Pj)
L
× 100% (2)
where HD(Pi, Pj) denotes the HD between Pi and Pj :
HD(Pi, Pj) =
L∑
m=1
(ri,m ⊕ rj,m) (3)
where ri,m and rj,m are the m-th bit of L-bit Pi and Pj ,
respectively.
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TABLE IV
AVERAGE HD WITH FIVE BOARDS AT U=1.20V
Method 25◦C 35◦C 45◦C 55◦C 65◦C
Neighbor 0.467 0.466 0.465 0.464 0.461
rPUF 0.467 0.469 0.468 0.463 0.462
Crossover RO 0.490 0.491 0.492 0.493 0.492
TABLE V
AVERAGE HD WITH FIVE BOARDS AT T=25◦C
Method 0.96V 1.08V 1.20V 1.32V 1.44V
Neighbor 0.459 0.462 0.467 0.473 0.473
rPUF 0.450 0.455 0.467 0.472 0.471
Crossover RO 0.500 0.491 0.490 0.499 0.492
Fig. 10. HD of crossover PUF output bits with temperature variation at
U=1.20V
In the experiments, we extract a hundred of 256-bit outputs
in each of five boards under 25◦C and 1.20V. Fig. 9 shows
the histogram of the inter-chip HD. The average HD between
any two pairs was 125.4 (49.0%), which is relatively close to
the ideal value 50%.
We get the PUF outputs at different temperature and voltage
levels. TABLE IV gives the average HD in different temper-
atures with U = 1.20V. TABLE V shows the average HD in
different voltages with T = 25◦C. We can see from Fig. 9,
TABLE IV and TABLE V that our proposed crossover RO
PUF has high uniqueness.
C. Reliability
Reliability is used to measure the stability of PUF response
in various environments. Ideally, the difference between any
two responses generated by a PUF under the same challenge
in repeated experiments should remain the same. Since factors
such as ambient temperature variation and supply voltage
fluctuation affect circuit delay in practice, the PUF responses
may be unreliable. The following formula is used to evaluate
the reliability of PUFs [1]:
r = 1− 1
x
x∑
y=1
HD(Ri, Ri,y)
L
× 100% (4)
where x is the number of samples for PUF response; Ri is
the response extracted from the board i; L is the number
Fig. 11. HD of crossover PUF output bits with voltage variation at T=25◦C
TABLE VI
AVERAGE HD WITH TEMPERATURE VARIATION AT U=1.20V
Method 35◦C 45◦C 55◦C 65◦C
Neighbor 0.041 0.048 0.052 0.051
rPUF 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.020
Crossover RO 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012
TABLE VII
AVERAGE HD WITH VOLTAGE VARIATION AT T=25◦C
Method 0.96V 1.08V 1.32V 1.44V
Neighbor 0.086 0.156 0.232 0.253
rPUF 0.083 0.127 0.174 0.185
Crossover RO 0.036 0.116 0.128 0.141
of generated response bits by the PUF; and HD(Ri, Ri,y)
denotes the HD between the response Ri and the y-th sampling
Ri,y .
The temperature variation plays a very important role to
the PUF performance in normal usage scenarios, because
it is an effective factor to affect the circuit delay. In this
paper, we select the temperature and voltage as the effective
environmental factors to verify the PUF performance.
For each 256-bit PUF on each board, we computed the HD
between responses at various temperatures and voltages. As
shown in Fig. 10, 92% of the responses were changed by
ten or fewer bits when the range of temperature is 35◦C to
65◦C, and no response experienced more than 20 bit flips. The
average is 3.33 (1.30% of the total number of 256 bits ). More
details of comparison under different temperatures are reported
in TABLE VI. Comparing the Fig. 9 with Fig. 10, we can
see a large gap in the distributions roughly between 21 ∼ 90
bits, which demonstrates that our proposed CRO PUF can be
effective for device authentication and anti-counterfeiting.
As shown in Fig. 11, the average distance between any
two pairs under the range of voltages is quite similar to
that of Fig. 10. The average HD increases from 3.33 to
3.61, and the maximum HD from 12 to 18. TABLE VII
shows the comparison of average HD with various voltages
for three methods. Comparing TABLE VII with TABLE VI,
we can see that the voltage factor has bigger influence on
the PUF reliability than the temperature. However, comparing
Fig. 11 with Fig.10, we can see that the gap still exists in
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Fig. 12. Comparison of reliable RO pairs
TABLE VIII
TRAINING TIME AND PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR CRO PUFS
PUF size
(row × column) Training time Accuracy
3× 5 5.096 100%
3× 7 0.739 99.9%
3× 9 28.013 99.9%
4× 5 0.411 99.9%
4× 7 62.136 99.9%
5× 5 2.027 99.9%
6× 5 13.607 99.9%
7× 5 50.721 99.9%
the distributions between 21 ∼ 90 bits, which means the PUF
proposed in the paper can still work effectively. As shown in
TABLE VI and TABLE VII, CRO PUF has a better reliability
than the other two methods in tolerating the temperature and
voltage variation.
Fig. 12 gives the reliability trend of RO PUF with various
temperatures (25◦C to 65◦C) when the voltage U = 1.20V. It
is shown that our proposed CRO PUF has better reliability
with the factor σ increasing.
D. Key-sharing
1) Extracting of delay matrix: We extract the delay matrix
for CRO PUFs with different sizes using the machine learning.
The experiment is conducted on an Intel (R) Core i5-3230M
CPU. We have extracted the delay matrices of different CRO
PUF sizes such as 3× 5, 3× 7, 3× 9, 4× 5, 4× 7, 5× 5, 6× 5
and 7 × 5. In our experiments, all delay paths and the
corresponding numbers in the counters are used as the training
data, and all CRPs are used as the testing data. TABLE VIII
gives the training time and the accuracy of the delay matrix
extracted from CRO PUFs with different sizes. The accuracy
is computed by comparing the matching rate of all CRPs
generated on the original delay matrix and predicted delay
matrix. Experimental results show that the predicted delay
matrix can achieve 99.9% accuracy. We extracted the delay
matrix from a 4 × 5 CRO PUF spending only 0.411s with
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Fig. 13. COS distribution
99.9% accuracy. For the 3 × 5 CRO PUF, we increased the
training time to 5.096s to achieve 100% accuracy.
2) Coefficient of stabilization: In order to verify the usabil-
ity of CRO PUF-based key-sharing method, we need to know
how many reliable CRPs for a PUF with a specified appro-
priate threshold. In the experiment, we define the coefficient
of stabilization (COS) to evaluate the percentage of reliable
CRPs.
COS = Rt/R (5)
where Rt is the number of CRPs that satisfy the threshold
condition, and R denotes the total number of CRPs.
The COS determines the number of reliable CRPs gener-
ated by the predicted delay matrix that we extracted. In the
experiment, we computed the COSs of 100, 000 simulated
4 × 5 CRO PUFs in three FPGA chips (D059546, D113702,
D225159). The experimental results are shown in Fig. 13. The
ordinate represents the number of CRO PUFs, and the abscissa
represents the COS. For example, [41:50] means that the COS
is between 41% and 50%. For a 4 × 5 CRO PUF, 10, 368
different CRPs can be generated. Assuming that the COS of
this CRO PUF is 50%, there are still 5184 CRPs that are
reliable at different temperatures. As a weak PUF, CRO PUF
can generate at least 100 reliable CRPs even with COS = 1%.
We can see from Fig. 13 that very few COSs are located in
the range of 3% ∼ 50% in our experiments, which indicates
that available CRPs are enough for key-sharing.
VII. CONCLUSION
In many embedded systems and IoT applications, resources-
limited devices cannot afford the classic cryptographic security
solutions. Lightweight security primitives are required. PUF is
an alternative solution for low cost key generation. In this pa-
per, we propose a new RO PUF structure which can effectively
improve the reliability and increase hardware efficiency. By
selecting different inverters in ROs, the frequency difference
between two ROs will be larger than the threshold, and
hence generate reliable responses. Compared to the previous
configurable RO PUFs, the experiment results on the public
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PUF dataset show that our proposed crossover RO PUF has
higher reliability and hardware efficiency. This is also the
first PUF structure that can generate the same shared-key in
physically for all devices. Therefore, CRO PUF can be applied
in the lightweight key-sharing protocol for IoT devices.
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